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The rapid growth in the functionality of Wi-Fi networking in recent years has benefited 
academic environments. Consistent with their role as centers of innovation academic 
institutions have an interest in facilitating as much mobile, computer networking 
functionality as possible to parties of varying levels of affiliation, while also assuring 
confidentiality and integrity of communications. Providing secure yet functional Wi-Fi 
access to guests and affiliates in an academic environment presents significant 
challenges. Academic institutions have taken a wide variety of approaches to this 
problem. This study presents and analyzes data gathered from semi-structured telephone 
interviews with employees focused on computer networking and security in academic 
environments regarding their institutions’ approaches toward striking a balance between 
security and functionality. The results are summarized, conclusions are presented, and 
solutions to common problems are reviewed. Finally, remaining significant research 
questions are presented and explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer networking has enabled significant improvements in communication, 
collaboration, and productivity. Academic institutions were among the first types of 
organizations to be enabled for such networking and to benefit from it. However, until 
mobile networking was designed, deployed, and proven useful highly functional 
computer networking necessitated that the end users’ computers be connected via various 
types of cabling. Mobile networking has enabled more opportunities for academic 
pursuits to occur anywhere, any time. The researcher or student who is struck by an 
innovative idea is able more easily than ever to communicate that idea to a colleague, 
explore relevant research conducted by others or capture the idea with less location-based 
restriction when they need to access computing resources. 
 
A wide variety of mobile networking technologies are deployed in full production today 
with many more in various stages of testing. These include mobile sensor networks, 
cellular technologies, and satellite communications among many others. Historically one 
of the most useful sets of wireless technologies deployed in campus environments has 
been wireless based on a set of standards known as the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers) 802.11 standards, also known as Wi-Fi and WLAN (Wireless 
Local Area Network). Technologies built on these standards have made significant 
contributions to campus networking due to their wide adoption and the functionality they 
provide. Such technologies strike a balance between “connected” mobility, speed of data
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transfer, and manageability of network resources. Although many types of wireless 
networking are deployed and more are being developed daily, this paper will deal only 
with wireless technologies characterized as IEEE 802.11, Wi-Fi and/or WLAN. Such 
wireless technologies will be referred to in this paper as Wi-Fi. 
 
Business, government, and military campuses have also benefited from mobility enabled 
by Wi-Fi technology. However, there is a set of cultural differences characteristic of most 
academic environments which distinguishes them from the usual business, government or 
military setting. Most academic campuses embrace an open, collaborative environment in 
which functionality is preferred over security. A military facility would require that 
certain security precautions be taken as a precondition to establishing a connection to 
their Wi-Fi network; whereas, an academic community with the same requirements might 
be seen as stifling the creativity and collaboration for which most academic institutions 
strive. Also, an overly restrictive Wi-Fi network at an academic institution could 
discourage a future student, a visiting researcher, a taxpayer visiting the library of a 
public institution or an alumnus considering a contribution to the institution. Although an 
open and highly available wireless networking capability in an academic environment is 
important, without adequate Wi-Fi security, valuable and sensitive information can 
harvested by an intruder as the information passes through the air from the Wi-Fi network 
adapter to the Wireless Access Point (WAP). Wired networking has been considered 
more secure than wireless networking due to the fact that the transfer media for wired 
networking (i.e., the wires) pass through facilities which can be locked and otherwise 
physically secured. Wi-Fi networking not only transmits the data through the air, where 
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the traffic can be harvested by an intruder, but it is also relatively simple for such 
intruders to create antennas which can harvest traffic from significant distances [1]. 
 
Consider for a moment two different perspectives on this technology which highlight the 
balance between security and functionality. Imagine the perspective of a small coffee 
shop proprietor who decides to offer Wi-Fi to encourage patronage by customers. 
Building security into such a Wi-Fi offering could discourage customers if it results in the 
customer having difficulty configuring their wireless device or having to maintain a 
separate configuration for that one coffee shop wireless network. Alternatively, imagine 
an entirely different Wi-Fi network. Imagine a Wi-Fi network set up in a research and 
development lab in a modern office building in which innovative development of new 
products is underway. Wireless networking allows researchers to collaborate more 
effectively since they are not required to be tethered to a network jack. However, if 
research data passing through the air were intercepted, the intruder could potentially sell 
or otherwise use the research to the disadvantage of the research and development lab. As 
a result, the networking and security support staff for such a research environment would 
likely set up a wireless network which required a secure configuration as a precondition 
of connection to the network, even if the configuration was difficult for end users to set 
up and maintain. This paper assumes the perspective that a college or university setting 
has features of both of the above environments. An open, highly available network 
facilitates collaboration and innovation, but sensitive information must be protected. 
Thus, colleges and universities face a struggle between ease of use and privacy regarding 
the design of their Wi-Fi networks. 
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Although law and regulation related to Wi-Fi will be addressed only briefly in this paper, 
some such obligations are imposed on academic institutions by law. Regulation which 
might have a direct impact on the functionality and security of Wi-Fi networking for 
guests would include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
and the Communications for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 
 
Data networking and information security professionals in academic environments face 
the formidable challenge of recommending to their institutional leadership a highly 
functional yet secure Wi-Fi architecture consistent with the missions of their 
organizations. This paper focuses on the decisions such institutions have made regarding 
their production Wi-Fi computer networks, and more specifically regarding provision of 
Wi-Fi services to guests. It explores the types of solutions they have deployed to address 
common problems, reviews problems which have not been solved or perhaps even 
recognized, and anticipates challenges and potential solutions. Some risk exists that this 
type of paper could provide information which would be useful to intruders. As a result, 
the identities of subjects and institutions that participated in the study are not retrievable 
from the remaining data. 
 
LAW AND REGULATION 
A considerable volume of law and regulation exists regarding the privacy and security of 
information. Moreover, legislative bodies are creating more regulation at all levels of 
government to address the risks inherent in our ability to communicate and transfer large 
amounts of data very quickly. Reviewing even the most important laws and regulations 
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that could have an impact on the design and implementation of production Wi-Fi 
networks serving guests in academic settings is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
two specific areas are being addressed briefly here to give the reader a sense of some 
challenges involved in balancing security and functionality for Wi-Fi guest access. 
 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
The Administrative Simplification provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) address data security and privacy protections that must be 
considered to safeguard Protected Health Information (PHI) within the United States of 
America. Deadlines for compliance were April of 2005 for large entities and April of 
2006 for smaller organizations. A large number of complex data security issues are 
addressed by HIPAA. One example from the Technical Safeguards in the Final Rule on 
Security Standards is the requirement that PHI be encrypted when the data is 
communicated over open networks [2,3]. 
 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
Disclaimer: The writer is not an attorney and is simply attempting to communicate a 
summary understanding of a very complex topic, CALEA. It is possible that the following 
two paragraph summary is in error in whole or in part. The intent below is not to 
interpret the law or regulation based on it but rather to point out the implications of law 
and regulation on provision of network access to Wi-Fi guest users. 
 
Legislation enacted into law in 1994 addresses the increased occurrence of telephone 
traffic passing over decentralized packet switching networks. The architecture of these 
types of networks resulted in difficulties performing the types of telephone wire taps 
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previously available to law enforcement agencies. CALEA required that 
telecommunications providers make available similar wire tap functionality previously 
provided for circuit switched networks, also known as landline telephone connections. In 
August, 2005, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reviewed the legislation 
in response to requests by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), and other organizations for clarification regarding whether 
and, if so, to what extent network providers must comply with such wire taps, otherwise 
known as lawful interceptions of data traffic. The FCC generally supported the FBI and 
DEA positions that providers are required to comply with lawful requests to intercept and 
produce data traffic and make it available in specified formats [4]. The deadline for 
compliance is currently set at May 14, 2007. 
 
Some debate has occurred regarding CALEA requirements and the types of groups which 
must comply. Some advocates have made the case that colleges and universities are 
exempt from compliance if their data networks are “private” networks but not if the 
organizations act as Internet Service Providers (ISP) by providing connectivity directly to 
the Internet for the public. Based on an opinion paper prepared by Perkins, Coie, LLP, 
and posted on the EDUCAUSE website, “This situation could arise if the institution 
provides Internet access to the surrounding city or county as a part of its community 
relations or outreach mission” [5]. However, no specific provision appears to exist in 
CALEA for an authentication infrastructure which would differentiate between access for 
the public and access for academic affiliates [6]. A case has been made that Wi-Fi guest 
access could be made available to buildings on academic campuses visited by the public 
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without triggering CALEA obligations [7]. Wi-Fi access on a campus would presumably 
be intended to benefit primarily academic affiliates. Do urban campuses have an 
obligation to prevent connections from adjacent public spaces or may they simply 
provide guest access to their affiliates and not concern themselves with leakage of signal 
availability into public spaces [8]? 
 
Construction of antennas that can provide connections to Wi-Fi networks from many 
times the distances possible with standard equipment on commonly used mobile 
equipment is relatively simple. Such antennas can also be purchased. [9,10]. Is the public 
user who obtains such an antenna to connect to a Wi-Fi network provided by a college or 
university an intruder or, in such a case, is the academic institution providing access to 
the public? A strong case could be made that such a user is an intruder but the question 
alludes to some of the complexities associated with an institution’s decision to provide 
secure and yet highly available access to guests who visit their physical campus.  
 
RELEVANT CORE TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
Wi-Fi 
Wi-Fi is a trademarked term owned by the Wi-Fi Alliance, a trade group formed to 
promote increased interoperability between wireless networking equipment designed, 
built, and proven to be consistent with the standards defined by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 committees and to endorse equipment as being 
in compliance with those standards [11]. The term WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network) 
is often used to refer to Wi-Fi networks but on careful analysis is a more general term 
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that could be used to refer to any wireless technology used to facilitate local area 
networking. 
 
IEEE 802.11 
IEEE 802.11 refers to a group of wireless local area networking standards defined by 
working group 11 of the IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee 802 [12]. 
 
Several amendments to the original standard are significant to this study.  Amendments a, 
b, and g refer to modulation techniques. Devices consistent with amendment 802.11b, 
such as wireless access points (WAPs) and wireless network interface cards (NICs), 
emerged on the market before 802.11g devices and 802.11a devices arrived on the market 
later. 802.11b and 802.11g equipment utilizes the 2.4 GHz frequency band and shares it 
with a wide variety of consumer devices such as microwave ovens and cordless landline 
telephones. Because 802.11g and b equipment is compatible, many implementations of 
11g, which has higher data transfer rates (i.e., throughput) than 11b, are also capable of 
11b communications. However a problem emerged in the implementation of 11g 
equipment: when a user connects via the 11b protocol to an 11g radio in a WAP, the 11g 
device drops to 11b mode and maximum throughput for all users of that radio drops to 
11b rates. Equipment based on the 802.11a standards utilizes the 5.0 GHz frequency band 
which is not as crowded as the 2.4 GHz band. 802.11a also offers more channels than 11b 
and 11g which allows for a higher density of radios where large numbers of users need to 
connect consecutively. The estimated signal range, given standard equipment, for all 
three subcommittee types is roughly equivalent [13]. Many wireless NICs now offer a, b 
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and g functionality in one card. Many access points offer 802.11g service with one radio 
which drops to 11b speeds for all users when any NIC requests 11b service and 
additionally an 11a radio as well.  Some newer access points offer any of the above three 
connection types and do not reduce speeds for 11g connections when a NIC connects 
using the 11b protocol. 
 
Working group 11 subcommittees were also created to agree on standards for wireless 
security. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was specified in the original 802.11 standard. 
It never lived up to its name and was found to have many significant weaknesses 
[14,15,16]. Working group 11i was formed to address each of the weaknesses of WEP in a 
new standard.  In the interim, the Wi-Fi Alliance recommended Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA), which amounted to those 11i specifications that were possible to implement on 
older hardware as an interim measure until 11i could be ratified and new 11i capable 
equipment deployed. 802.11i is also referred to often as WPA2. The above 
specifications--WEP, WPA and WPA2/11i—address encryption of data, key 
management and integrity of communications [17]. 
 
Virtual Private Networking 
According to a definition available at wikipedia.org, “A virtual private network (VPN) is 
a private communication network often used by companies or organizations, to 
communicate confidentially over a public network” [18]. As clarified at techtarget.com, 
‘In effect, the protocols, by encrypting data at the sending end and decrypting it at the 
receiving end, send the data through a "tunnel" that cannot be "entered" by data that is not 
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properly encrypted. An additional level of security involves encrypting not only the data, 
but also the originating and receiving network addresses’ [19]. 
 
A variety of types of VPN technology may be used in Wi-Fi networks. Some VPNs such 
as more traditional IPSEC VPNs require installation of software on the client computer. 
Others utilize software built into the operating system running on devices and others, 
known as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) VPNs, utilize security functionality originally built 
for web browsers to create an encrypted tunnel between devices.  
 
Authentication 
An important issue regarding sponsorship of Wi-Fi connectivity is the ability to confirm 
that the network is only accessed by authorized parties when that is the policy of the 
institution. A variety of standards and protocols apply to Wi-Fi authentication of guests. 
Detail regarding authentication protocols commonly used with Wi-Fi is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, IEEE 802.1x, RADIUS and EAP are among protocols frequently 
utilized in Wi-Fi networking. At the most general level, 802.1x [20] specifies an 
authentication architecture which is intended to limit access to ports or services by users 
who can prove their identity. It is often used to invoke Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) [21] types for negotiation of authentication and then security. RADIUS (Remote 
Authentication Dial-in User Service) [22] is frequently used as an authentication server in 
Wi-Fi environments. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
When academic institutions of higher learning have decided to provide Wi-Fi access to 
guests, what strategies have they used to address the challenges? How do they go about 
providing highly available access, maintaining the security their affiliates need and 
remaining compliant with relevant regulations? This qualitative research will provide 
access to detail regarding a number of strategies chosen by practicing network and 
security specialists and will help to clarify the extent to which packaged, proprietary, 
commercial solutions are available versus the degree to which solutions need to be and/or 
are custom-built. Such information does not appear to be available elsewhere at this time. 
This paper is also intended to raise issues and expose strategies that might spark further 
relevant discussion and research in this field. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Use of Wi-Fi Technology on Academic Campuses 
Based on research conducted by the Campus Computing Project, wireless networking 
was accessible from over half of college classrooms in 2006, an increase from 42.7 
percent in 2005 and 31.1 percent in 2004. Furthermore, 60.5 percent of colleges and 
universities increased their Information Technology (IT) budgets for implementation of 
wireless technology for the 2006 academic year [23]. 
 
A number of studies document the widespread use and growth of Wi-Fi technology in 
academic settings. Researchers at MIT in 2006 estimated that approximately 25% of the 
unique users of the MIT computer network on any given day were connecting via Wi-Fi 
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[24]. Researchers at Dartmouth College logged between 800 and 1000 unique network 
cards (based on unique media access control identifiers) accessing their Wi-Fi network 
per day in the Fall of 2001 [25]. As of early 2004, researchers at the same institution were 
logging 3000 to 3500 unique network cards per day. They concluded that a growing 
number of users were taking advantage of Wi-Fi and that users were far more active on 
the Wi-Fi network as well. They also reported a growth in the diversity of traffic types 
for which Wi-Fi was used from 2001 to 2004. Further, they concluded that Wi-Fi 
networking has evidently replaced wired connectivity for many academic users despite 
the limited, shared bandwidth associated with the 802.11b network they studied [26]. 
In addition to growth in the diversity of traffic types, we are also seeing growth in the 
types of devices connecting. The Wi-Fi Alliance has recently published documentation 
that almost 100 telephones have been certified as Wi-Fi compliant [27]. Surely, academic 
affiliates will want to use the full range of such devices. 
 
It appears that academic campuses continue to invest in Wi-Fi networking. Geek.com 
reported that, based on Intel’s “Most Unwired College Campuses” report in 2005, 
seventy-five percent (75%) of the campuses which Intel considered to have the best 
wireless coverage have full campus coverage (i.e., 100%). In the 2004 study, only 
fourteen percent (14%) of the top 50 schools had one hundred percent (100%) coverage 
[28]. 
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Federated Authentication 
Naturally, the faculty member with appointments at two related institutions or the student 
who needs to visit libraries at four separate universities to obtain all the information 
needed for a research project would benefit from the ability to use the same 
authentication credentials on Wi-Fi networks at the various institutions. Certainly, the 
practice of using the same credentials at different locations is already in place among 
some commercial vendors of Wi-Fi services. Identity management professionals are 
aware of such needs. Various standards have been and are being vetted. Committees and 
working groups are being formed and examples of federated authentication are in 
production. Below are a few examples of activities relevant to federated authentication 
which could have an impact on Wi-Fi networking for academic guests. 
 
Discussions are being held between all types of organizations regarding portability of 
authentication.  An example of discussions occurring in academic circles is the dialog 
sponsored by EDUCAUSE. EDUCAUSE is “a nonprofit association whose mission is to 
advance higher education by promoting the intelligent use of information technology” 
[29]. A quote from the EDUCAUSE website regarding the agenda for their Identity 
Management workgroup is typical of discussions occurring these days regarding 
portability of authentication:  
 
Identity Management is moving ahead rapidly. Shibboleth and InCommon 
are making great strides. Representatives from the banking and credit-card 
industries are sitting around the table with federal and state government 
agencies in the E-Authentication Partnership. The Credential Assessment 
Framework, developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
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Technology, is being applied to an expanding federation of public and 
private institutions, including a number of campuses. The Identity 
Management Working Group will review these and other current activities 
of interest and chart a path for future action [30]. 
 
An example of a well-known, federated authentication initiative is Shibboleth. 
 
Shibboleth is an initiative to develop an open, standards-based solution to 
the needs for organizations to exchange information about their users in a 
secure, and privacy-preserving manner. The initiative is facilitated by 
Internet2 and a group of leading campus middleware architects from 
member schools and corporate partners. The organizations that may want 
to exchange information include higher education, their partners, digital 
content providers, government agencies, etc. The purpose of the exchange 
is typically to determine if a person using a web browser (e.g., Internet 
Explorer, Netscape Navigator, Mozilla) has the permissions to access a 
resource at a target resource based on information such as being a member 
of an institution or a particular class. The system is privacy preserving in 
that it leads with this information, not with an identity, and allows users to 
determine whether to release additional information about themselves. An 
open solution means both an open architecture and a functioning, open-
source implementation. Standards-based means that the information that is 
exchanged between organizations can interoperate with that from other 
solutions [31]. 
 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is just one among several examples of a 
specific, xml-based protocol for exchanging user information to facilitate authentication 
and authorization [32]. The SAML protocol elements were formulated by the Liberty 
Alliance, an organization created to promote an open, standards-based approach to 
sharing information regarding identity in a secure way which assures privacy [33]. 
 
A group sponsored by Internet2.org, the Salsa-FWNA (Federated Wireless Network 
Authentication) Working Group, is specifically addressing what they refer to as the 
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“visiting scholar” problem [34]. A related group focusing on the more general challenges 
of network access on academic campuses is the Salsa-NetAuth Working Group [35]. 
 
Adaptive Wireless 
Questions are being raised in the literature about when and how cellular and Wi-Fi 
devices will be capable of utilizing common authentication infrastructures to swap 
service seamlessly for end users [36]. Such authentication functionality would be easier 
and more useful if wireless devices were capable of detecting the types of radio 
connectivity available at any given time and then using the appropriate wireless protocol 
at the appropriate time--whether cellular, Wi-Fi or some other type. Cognitive radio is a 
term used to refer to devices which can detect the types of radio signals available for 
communications in the real time environment and to originate actions based on that 
information to meet the requests of end users [37]. Although such functionality may not 
be available widely in the near future, the potential benefits of federated authentication 
combined with adaptive radios are easy to envision. Wi-Fi or cellular wireless 
connectivity offers some significant improvements over wired connectivity in terms of 
mobility as discussed above. However, imagine an end user device that could detect the 
best type of wireless connection available, facilitate authentication and authorization to 
resources via the best connection and then maintain the functionality needed by the end 
user while the end user is mobile, even as the types of radio signals or protocols to 
connect to them change. Do cognitive radio and federated authentication offer hope that 
such seamless wireless connectivity could be possible some day? 
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Human Information Interaction 
A body of literature exists regarding the states of knowledge users bring to information 
rich environments. Is it the case that most users visiting a college campus know that their 
ability to complete certain tasks via wireless networking is actually quite different at most 
universities from the abilities they have when they connect via a home wireless 
connection or a wired connection on that same campus? Do users realize that often they 
will not have access to certain services or do they believe they will have an experience 
equivalent to wired networking?  
 
Taylor has described the levels of questioning a user who seeks information brings to an 
information rich environment [38]. Belkin has described “Anomalous States of 
Knowledge” in which users recognize that they might need additional information to 
resolve a problem, “… but precisely because of the inquirer’s lack of knowledge about 
the problem area, it is impossible to specify what would resolve it” [39]. If users do 
encounter a lack of functionality with Wi-Fi or suspect that there are limitations on Wi-Fi 
networking and want to know more, what should the end user do? How do they describe 
what they need and how do information professionals help these end users understand the 
facts and accomplish their networking objectives [40, 41]? 
 
What risks are inherent in Wi-Fi networking and are users aware of them? What 
responsibilities do computer networking and security professionals have to communicate 
such risks and to educate end users? 
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Security Threats 
Results of a 2006 survey of campus IT officials by the Campus Computing Project 
suggest that respondents believe, as they have for the third consecutive year of the 
survey, that security threats will continue to be the single most important technology 
issue facing their institutions over the next two to three years. This stands in contrast to 
the most important reported issue from 2000 to 2003, integration of instructional 
technology. Although some types of security incidents were believed to be less common 
in 2006 over 2005, identity theft and security incidents related to social networking sites 
reportedly increased [42]. 
 
Various applications have been created to harvest data as it passes through the air. Many 
such applications target Wi-Fi networking and are easily obtained through a free 
download. Although wireless networking’s risks of interception by intruders are widely 
known, encryption of wireless traffic is not universal. Although good data is hard to find, 
many estimates suggest that half or more of wireless networks do not require any type of 
encryption to connect [43]. RSA, a well-known information security firm, reported that 
almost 25% of Wi-Fi networks operated by businesses in large cities around the world 
were found to have no security measures in place at all [44]. A study published by the 
United States Government Accountability Office in 2005 concluded that, of twenty-four 
wireless networks studied at government agencies, thirteen did not have any 
configuration requirements for wireless networks, and the eleven agencies which did 
submit configuration requirements were missing key elements of security, including 
encryption requirements in some cases [45]. At an annual Defcon hacker conference a list 
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of captured log-in credentials is maintained on what is known as the “wall of sheep” [46]. 
This would suggest that even in known high risk environments, end users will accept the 
risk of letting their log-in information or other sensitive information pass through the air 
where it is in danger of being intercepted. Although it stands to reason that an end user 
would seek to perform the same types of activities on a wireless network as on a wired 
network, the extent to which end users understand the risk associated with wireless 
networking and are prepared to take the risk is unclear. 
 
Researchers at Saskatchewan University confirmed with network traces that protocols, 
such as telnet and ftp, which pass authentication information in the clear (i.e., 
unencrypted) were utilized by wireless users in one academic environment [47]. Again, 
this demonstrates that the end users’ networking needs do not vary when they move from 
wired networking, which relies on media (i.e., cables) that can be physically secured, to 
wireless networking, in which the media (i.e., open air space) cannot be secured. 
 
A strategy used by some organizations to counter the threat from wireless sniffers has 
been to choose not to broadcast the Service Set Identifier (SSID) or network name.  This 
strategy provides only minimal protection in that it hides the existence of the wireless 
network only from the least sophisticated sniffers [48]. The end user would not be 
presented with the SSID but it would be relatively easy to obtain by anyone intent on 
discovering it.  Another strategy used by some organizations is to specify that WAPs they 
control only allow access by those network cards which have the unique identifiers which 
match the wireless network adapters used by authorized users.  Not only does this 
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strategy not scale very well in large environments, but it has also become trivial for an 
intruder to adopt the unique identifier of a known authorized user [49]. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Subject Recruitment 
 
Archives of four listservs focusing on computing security and/or Wi-Fi networking in 
college and university environments were browsed for contributions regarding “wireless 
guest access” from August of 2006 to March of 2007. In addition to browsing lists for 
contributions, the following question was posed to the same lists: “What are academic 
institutions doing regarding wireless guest access and security?” Subjects who had either 
posted recently to one of the listservs on the topic or who responded to the posted 
question were sent a recruitment email (Appendix A). A total of forty-four recruitment 
email messages were sent. Twenty potential subjects responded via email that they 
agreed to participate and one additional respondent agreed to participate in a telephone 
call directly to the investigator. The recruitment email contained information regarding 
the identity of the researcher, the purpose of the study, plans for data security within the 
study context, information regarding actions the researcher would take to assure 
anonymity, plans for publishing the data gathered, and specific information regarding the 
freedom to consent or decline consent. One subject declined a telephone interview but 
agreed to be interviewed via email. Because the verbal exchange of information was 
found to be one of the most valuable aspects of this qualitative study, the subject who 
declined a telephone interview was removed from the study. In four cases, subjects 
indicated they were not the most knowledgeable person regarding Wi-Fi capabilities at 
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the institution they represent or they did not believe they had adequate knowledge to 
participate. In one such case, the potential subject attempted a referral to an expert at the 
subject institution. When the referral did not succeed, the subject was dropped from the 
study. For two cases in which the potential subjects claimed to have less than adequate 
knowledge, the subjects’ telephone comments were supplemented with web-based 
research and the subjects sought and obtained experts on Wi-Fi networking at their 
institutions who agreed to participate in the telephone interviews. In the fourth such case, 
the subject was interviewed and found to have the requisite knowledge to participate in 
the study. Nineteen subjects (43% of those sent recruitment emails) were retained in the 
study. 
 
Sample 
 
Nineteen subjects were recruited from listservs which focus on computing security and 
Wi-Fi networking in college and university environments. All nineteen subjects were 
interviewed via telephone between March 2, 2007 and March 22, 2007. All subjects were 
employed by colleges or universities in the United States of America as networking 
and/or information security professionals or performed similar duties while serving as 
faculty members. Seven of nineteen institutions represented by respondents (37%) are 
private and the remaining institutions public. 
 
Consent 
In every case, subjects received consent information via email as described above and via 
telephone. On making a telephone connection with a potential subject, information 
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regarding the purpose of the study and consent information was reviewed before verbal 
consent for participation in the research was granted by each subject. No potential subject 
declined participation once telephone contact had been made and information regarding 
consent reviewed verbally. All nineteen potential subjects were retained in the study. 
 
Data Collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a base set of open-ended questions 
regarding wireless guest access (See Appendix B). The questions were intended to offer 
flexibility and even encouragement for subjects to share any information they thought 
relevant to security and functionality of Wi-Fi guest access on their campuses. 
 
RESULTS 
Guest Access 
Three distinct types of guest access were identified in the survey: 
 
1. Access for visitors who were located on or physically proximate to the campus 
but who did not need to demonstrate affiliation with the institution other than 
being physically present on campus. These users could be referred to as “true 
guests.” 
 
2. “Sponsored guest” access refers to a situation in which a known affiliate of the 
institution who is authorized to sponsor guests vouches for a guest and a record of 
such sponsorship is preserved and can be retrieved in the event of a Wi-Fi 
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networking incident involving the guest. An example of such an incident would 
include a guest’s computer exploiting or attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in 
other systems. 
 
3. Guest access is made available at times for specific events such as seminars or 
conferences. Such access might be offered as in the above two scenarios or a 
single method of access might be provided to all participants of an event, resulting 
in the ability for systems administrators, networking staff and/or security staff to 
identify a user as a participant in an event but without the ability to more 
specifically identify a user should an incident such as that described above 
develop. One could refer to this type of access as “event guest” access. 
 
Only one subject of nineteen interviewed (5.3%) reported that no wireless guest access of 
any kind is available at the institution they represent. Four of nineteen institutions (21%) 
offer true guest access but do not offer sponsored guest access. Eight of nineteen (42%) 
offer some form of true guest access from at least some of their WAPs. Ten of nineteen 
institutions represented in this study (53%) require sponsorship of guests in order for the 
guest to connect via Wi-Fi. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the institutions represented in 
this survey offer some form of guest access for events. See figure 1 below for a graphical 
summary. 
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Figure 1: Guest Access by Type 
 
Although this study is not intended to identify specific brands of software or hardware 
and did not find any one product to be sufficient to meet all Wi-Fi networking, security 
and/or functionality needs, one specific product brand was identified more frequently 
than others by respondents in the context of supporting wireless guest access. Six of 
eighteen institutions (33%) which offer some type of Wi-Fi guest access utilize a product 
known as Bluesocket to support their wireless guest offerings. 
 
A number of respondents indicated that rogue WAPs and ad hoc connections via nearby 
laptops have grown in number to the extent that they provide a significant amount of 
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network access at their institutions. An ad hoc connection is one in which a user connects 
via the wireless card of another user which is essentially acting as a WAP. Guest access 
provided via ad hoc connections to the equipment of authorized users and rogue access 
points will not be addressed here. 
 
A small number of respondents referred to kiosk machines in libraries and other public 
places as an offering of guest access. Because no cases arose in which such kiosks were 
wireless, detailed information was not gathered. Although the literature regarding 
wireless access does include some situations in which academic institutions loan wireless 
laptops to library patrons or via their help desks, for example, no subject in this study 
reported such a program as a part of a Wi-Fi guest access program at their institution. 
 
No subject reported using federated authentication for Wi-Fi guest access beyond their 
own institution; however, three of eighteen respondents (17%) reported that they are 
investigating such possibilities. A small number of subjects commented that the academic 
institutions they represent are using distributed methods of authentication which provide 
the flexibility of a federated environment within their organizations.  
 
True Guest 
Eight of nineteen institutions studied (42%) offer some form of true guest access from at 
least some of their WAPs. Half of the institutions which provide true guest access are 
private; half are public. Three of the eight institutions (38%) which offer true guest 
access utilize a strategy of a non-broadcast SSID to limit connections by users not 
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familiar with the environment. Six of the eight institutions (75%) limit ports/services on 
outbound connections via access control lists and eighty-eight percent (88%) limit 
inbound connections in various ways including access control lists. Six of the eight 
institutions (75%) providing true guest access allow outbound access to ports commonly 
used to establish VPN connections. 
 
Respondents reported being generally unaware of any true guest access offerings in 
HIPAA environments and, further, reported that any such access would be heavily 
secured in a variety of ways. Two of the eight respondents (25%) who indicated that the 
institution they represent offers true guest access said they are considering eliminating or 
significantly altering their true guest offerings due to concerns regarding CALEA, but 
none had made any such changes as of the interview date. 
 
Five of the eight institutions (63%) make true guest access available via a captive portal 
to which the user connects when they launch a browser. Three of the eight institutions 
(38%) that offer true wireless guest access also reportedly warn users of the risks of 
wireless networking without encryption but only one such institution requires users to 
acknowledge (in that case with a button to click on a captive portal) that they understand 
such risks before they are allowed to proceed to use the network. Seven of the eight 
subjects (88%) who reported that their institutions provide true wireless guest access also 
reported that they are familiar with the level of logging of guest access connections. Of 
those seven, two (29%) report that they would describe the level of logging as detailed 
and five (71%) report what could be described as limited or minimal logging for such 
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true guest connections. Fifty percent of respondents (four of eight) who indicate that their 
institution provides true guest access report that some filtering of true guest network 
traffic is in place for content such as peer-to-peer traffic. Six of eight such institutions 
(75%) have implemented rate limiting for true guest connections which is more 
restrictive than throughput rates allowed for other wireless connections. 
 
One of the eight institutions offers a means of encryption from the user’s Wi-Fi device to 
the network provided by the institution. In that case encryption could be initiated by 
downloading a VPN client from a captive portal the guest must traverse to gain Wi-Fi 
access. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation. 
13%
87%
No Encryption Offered Encryption via VPN Available
 
 
Figure 2: Encryption Available to True Guests 
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Sponsored Guest 
A small number of respondents reported that informal sponsorship of guests occurs at 
their institutions. This could occur if, for example, a guest was to be “loaned” a login by 
an authorized user or if an authorized user was able to set up an account or otherwise 
enable a user without an approved policy regarding such sponsorship at the institution. 
Only formal, sponsored guest programs endorsed by institutions are included in this 
study. It is also the case that most academic institutions accommodate long-term affiliates 
by allowing such guests to demonstrate adequate affiliation to obtain the same type of 
authentication account used by faculty, staff and/or students. Those situations are not 
addressed in this study. 
 
Fourteen of nineteen (74%) respondents reported that their institutions make available 
some type of “sponsored guest” access. The method for obtaining access varies widely. 
In some cases, a potential guest creates a request via a web form which is then available 
for a sponsor to process. The sponsor might then endorse or approve the access which 
results in an identifier (ID) connected to the sponsor’s ID. The user name and password 
to such an account is often available only to the sponsor who shares the information with 
the guest. At three institutions of the fourteen (21%) offering sponsored guest access, the 
guest must utilize a temporary password given them by their sponsor to generate a new 
password known only to the guest before they are allowed access to the Wi-Fi network. 
At most institutions the sponsor obtains the user name and password and shares it with 
the guest but the guest is not given an opportunity to change the password unless they 
specifically request a change. In a small percentage of cases the process is paper-based. 
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Four of fourteen institutions (29%) require that sponsored guest access be initiated by 
contacting their IT help desk. Two of the fourteen institutions (14%) which offer 
sponsored Wi-Fi guest access do not broadcast the SSID for that access. Ten of fourteen 
institutions (71%) offering sponsored guest access utilize captive web portals (i.e., a 
browser is forced to a single page) to assist in the management of the service. 
 
Fifty percent (50%) of institutions supporting sponsored guest access for Wi-Fi only 
allow employees (i.e., faculty, staff and in a few cases student employees) to sponsor 
guests.  Some institutions allow anyone with a campus ID to sponsor a guest. Others have 
designated administrative staff in various departments who are authorized to sponsor 
guests. Often these administrative staff members also receive security training in support 
of such sponsorship responsibilities. Six of fourteen respondents (43%) report that, at the 
institutions they represent, at least some students can sponsor guest access. 
 
Maximum allowed duration for sponsored guest access varies widely. Nine respondents 
(64%) of the fourteen which provide sponsored Wi-Fi guest access were able to specify a 
maximum duration at their institution. The mean, median and mode for maximum 
duration were sixty-five (65) days, sixty (60) days, and ninety (90) days respectively. The 
shortest duration reported was one Wi-Fi session. Thus, in this last case the sponsor must 
authorize each connection attempt by the guest. 
 
Only three of fourteen institutions (21%) filter the network traffic content of sponsored 
guests to exclude unwanted traffic types. Peer-to-peer networking traffic and protocols 
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which allow user login information to pass in the clear (e.g., telnet and ftp) were 
mentioned as types of traffic blocked. Five of fourteen subjects (36%) reported that their 
institutions impose more limits on throughput rates for sponsored guest access than for 
users such as faculty and staff. Six of fourteen subjects (43%) said their institution allows 
any outbound service/port for sponsored Wi-Fi guests; one indicated that their institution 
also allows any inbound service/port. The most commonly allowed ports are 80 (WWW), 
443 (SSL) and ports associated with VPNs. Most institutions only allow communications 
on a small number of ports outbound for Wi-Fi guests, including sponsored guests, and 
deny inbound access. 
 
Subjects were asked to characterize the level of logging they obtain for Wi-Fi sponsored 
guest access. No scale was used in the question itself and the responses were subjective; 
however, twelve of fourteen subjects (86%) did answer the question. Seven of fourteen 
reported that the organization they represent provides only minimal or light logging of 
such access. Five of fourteen respondents (36%) reported heavy or detailed logging of 
events related to Wi-Fi sponsored guest access.  Log retention times vary widely. Fifty 
percent of subjects were aware of and shared log retention times.  The mean, median and 
mode of reported times are 365 days, 45 days, and 30 days respectively. The longest log 
retention time reported was seven years. 
 
Thirteen of fourteen subjects (93%) reported that they believe their networking 
acceptable use policy (AUP) includes information regarding the limitations on 
appropriate use of Wi-Fi access, at least in general terms. However, only five of fourteen 
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(36%) could confirm that the sponsor or guest must acknowledge agreement to comply 
with the policy before being granted access. Subjects were asked if at any point in the 
process of obtaining sponsored guest access a potential guest is warned about the risks 
associated with wireless networking as opposed to wired networking. One of fourteen 
subjects declined to answer questions on this topic. Of the remaining thirteen subjects, 
three (23%) reported that an effort is made to help sponsored guests understand the risks. 
Two of the above three handle warning of guests in FAQ (frequently asked question) 
documents on their websites. However, in only one case out of thirteen (8%) were 
sponsors or potential guests required to acknowledge the risks before being granted 
access. In the above single case the sponsor must confirm that they agree to warn the 
guest about the risks before the sponsor is allowed to complete the sponsorship. Thus no 
institution studied requires that a guest acknowledge, perhaps with a button on a captive 
portal page, that they are aware of the risks of Wi-Fi networking and accept those risks 
before they can connect to sponsored Wi-Fi networking. However, it should be noted that 
at one institution, sponsored guests can only connect using 802.1x, WPA and EAP, thus 
significantly reducing the risks of Wi-Fi networking. 
 
More than half of those institutions offering sponsored guest access do not offer any type 
of encryption to those guests. Eight of fourteen respondents (57%) indicated that the 
institution they represent does not offer any type of encryption for the network traffic of 
Wi-Fi sponsored guests. However, most (76%) allow the end user to create an outbound 
VPN connection, if the guest wants to and knows how to do so. Creating such a VPN 
tunnel would encrypt any traffic between the Wi-Fi device and the network where the 
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tunnel terminates but not to other networks, likely leaving some traffic unencrypted. Six 
of fourteen subjects (43%) reported that their institution does have a means of providing 
encryption to a Wi-Fi sponsored guest. Four of fourteen offer a VPN client download 
which would secure (i.e., encrypt) traffic from the end user to the campus VPN 
server/concentrator/termination. At three of the four institutions, the guest need ask for 
the VPN download by contacting the help desk. One offers it on the captive portal guests 
must traverse to connect. One institution offering sponsored Wi-Fi guest access requires a 
WPA configuration and one offers VPN, WEP, and WPA options to sponsored guests. 
More specifically, only one institution of fourteen (7%) offering sponsored Wi-Fi guest 
access was reported to require Extensible Authentication Protocol (in that case, in 
combination with WPA and 802.1x) for such access. One other institution of fourteen 
offers WEP or WPA for encryption but only in pre-shared key mode. In pre-shared key 
mode the same key is used on every system. Pre-shared key mode is less secure and 
changing the key can be very difficult in implementation because it must be changed on 
every host. Those subjects who offered comments on this subject volunteered that they 
believe the software (also known as supplicant software) for coordinating security and 
functionality between authentication servers and Wi-Fi clients as specified by 802.1x, 
EAP, and 802.11i, is not yet available for all the operating systems they need to support 
and that Public Key Infrastructure requirements and other requirements regarding 
configuration of end user systems are too burdensome at this time to make 
implementation feasible. 
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Figure 3: Encryption Offered for Sponsored Guests 
 
Event Guest 
Most colleges and universities have a formal program of accommodation for guests to 
connect to their Wi-Fi networks during events sponsored by the institution. Only one 
institution of the nineteen studied does not accommodate such access. This type of access 
was found to be one of the most complex because so many variables exist, depending on 
how long the event lasts, the number of users, and the users’ level of affiliation. In many 
ways this type is merely a composite of the other two types of guest access detailed 
above, in that many event guests use true guest access or are sponsored. The sponsorship 
is often initiated either with a visit to a graphical user interface on a web site which 
allows sponsors (who, in the case of event-based sponsorship are often designated 
departmental administrators) to host many users or with a call to a help desk. With event-
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based access, it is sometimes the case that all event attendees connect with the same user 
name and password or the same method. However, many respondents reported that the 
same user name and password for a single event is actually less common than in the past 
given that true guest and sponsored guest access have become so common. The most 
likely scenario for a single user name and password to be used by everyone at an event is 
when true guest access is not available or does not meet the needs of the event users or 
the sponsored guest access process does not scale well to large numbers of users. In 
practice, based on subjective comments by respondents, the reality appears to be that end 
users at an event might be connecting with various types of authentication and thus a 
variety of levels of security and functionality. For example, a professor sponsoring a 
week long conference might connect with a university ID and thus have access to 
sensitive systems, have higher throughput capacity and have minimal limits on 
services/ports to any destination. A student from the same institution might not have 
access to the same sensitive systems (e.g., a departmental database server) but have 
greater access than a conference attendee. Either or both of the above might have rights to 
use a campus VPN or one of the 802.11 specified forms of encryption--WEP, WPA or 
WPA2/802.11i. The attendees logging in with a user name and password written on the 
white board on the first day of a conference might only have access to ports 80 (WWW), 
443 (SSL) and ports commonly used for VPN. In this scenario, a student or professor 
from the sponsoring institution not familiar with Wi-Fi functionality and security might 
not be aware of all their options and therefore might use the user name and password 
written on the white board rather than their campus ID, their sponsored account, or even 
true guest access, any one of which might or might not allow them more functionality 
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than the authentication information specified for the event. Some event attendees might 
connect with a sponsored account which gives them additional access privileges beyond 
those allowed for the ID written on the white board. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Academic institutions acknowledge the need to provide Wi-Fi access to their guests to 
enable legitimate use of campus resources and are providing such services. 
 
It is not clear that end users are aware of limitations on the services they are using nor is 
it clear that such institutions are taking all action possible 1) to make sure that guests are 
aware of added risks associated with network traffic passing through the air and 2) to 
enable encryption of that network traffic within the geographic bounds of the campuses 
on which the Wi-Fi networking occurs. More awareness training for end users, web-
based information regarding risks, admonitions and disclaimers regarding risks, 
requirements that end users acknowledge the risks, and provision of tools to reduce the 
risks (e.g., VPNs, 802.11 encryption types, etc.) would all seem to be reasonable 
responses that colleges and universities might take to provide more security for end users 
and campuses alike. An added benefit might be that academic users would be better 
prepared to understand the risks they face with Wi-Fi networking off of their academic 
campuses. Some respondents raised concerns that help desks could be overwhelmed by 
the amount of end user support required to secure such end user traffic. End users may 
need to take the initiative to become more sophisticated regarding Wi-Fi and other 
computer networking security issues such that they can protect themselves from 
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intruders. To what extent the growth of awareness and the skills by academic users to 
secure their Wi-Fi traffic can be supported or perhaps even integrated into the curriculum 
by the academic institutions with which users are affiliated remains an open question. 
 
One wonders to what extent port/services limitations seen in this study occur for Wi-Fi 
users who are not guests? That is, is Wi-Fi networking generally more restricted in 
academic settings than is wired networking? Are Wi-Fi guest end users aware of the 
many functionality differences between computing on a home Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) connection on which most if not all ports/services are allowed or on a campus 
wired connection (perhaps with a few limitations) as opposed to a Wi-Fi connection. The 
Wi-Fi guest user who seeks only web (port 80 and 443) access will not encounter a 
problem with functionality on the Wi-Fi networks studied here, but are the majority of 
applications secured (perhaps with SSL) such that the application assures encryption of 
sensitive information? Do end users in academic settings know how to determine whether 
an application is secured or not such that they can decide not to use an obviously risky 
application? This research suggests that more sophisticated Wi-Fi guest users will find 
that many services are not available. To what extent do users want and need more 
functionality to enable the types of activities appropriate to an academic setting? Some 
literature suggests that the types of services end users seek via Wi-Fi networking for their 
academic pursuits are expanding. Will an expansion in the ports/services allowed occur 
in response? If not, is security the reason? Do expanded needs for Wi-Fi traffic 
types/ports allowed/services require encryption of Wi-Fi traffic? To what extent do end 
users connect to a less privileged connection by accident when they are authorized to 
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connect with more privileges? Many important research questions remain in these areas. 
In some cases log analysis could be valuable in clarifying the opportunities and 
challenges. 
 
Guests would likely seek full traffic type/port range/service functionality if given a 
choice. Some institutions have addressed this by offering multiple types of more and less 
secure wireless access. In every case, the more secure access also requires more expertise 
for configuration and troubleshooting. End user awareness of the risks appears to be a 
prerequisite to a user implementing or seeking to implement encryption or other 
enhancements to improve the security or functionality of their Wi-Fi connection. Are 
users aware of the risks? Data collected here suggests that institutions are not providing 
as much information regarding risks of unencrypted Wi-Fi networking to guest users as 
would be possible.  
 
The opportunity for additional education of end users to improve security and set the 
stage for increased functionality emerged from this research in several areas. Helping end 
users understand risks and offering solutions potentially imposes an additional traffic 
burden on help desks but also contributes to institutional security of sensitive 
information. Several subjects who reported that their institutions do offer VPN access to 
Wi-Fi guest users indicated that very few people know about this potential functionality. 
The help desk impact of end users asking for added wireless security must be considered, 
but if Wi-Fi access were to become as safe as wired access, it is possible that more ports 
and services could be supported securely and the academic value of free access to 
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information to encourage a free exchange of ideas and information could be enhanced. Is 
it a reasonable goal to endeavor to communicate to faculty, staff, and student 
constituencies that more end user understanding of networking security can help enable 
more functionality and thus facilitate moving closer to the collaborative ideal sought by 
most universities? Although wireless networks are reported to be vulnerable to sniffers, 
does research exist regarding the degree to which end users are aware of both the risks 
and the tools available to counter those threats? 
 
The security strategy of not broadcasting the SSID is still implemented by a number of 
institutions even though that strategy is only useful in limiting access by the relatively 
naïve Wi-Fi user. To the extent this strategy is still used at all, it appears to be used 
primarily in the true guest environment to prevent connections by users who have no 
awareness of the true guest configuration. An intruder can easily discover such an SSID 
with free tools which are widely available. 
 
A few subjects commented that they are seeing combination Wi-Fi and cellular (or other 
wireless) devices on their campuses now but they are not yet seeing significant adaptive 
functionality. To what extent will cognitive radio and other adaptive technologies allow 
guest users to connect how, when and where needed to facilitate their academic pursuits?  
Subjects reported that benefits of Wi-Fi over other forms of wireless networking remain 
manageability of traffic and greater throughput than competing technologies such as 
cellular. If services are managed in ways that fail to meet the needs of end users, might 
other forms of wireless replace Wi-Fi? 
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No case of federated authentication being used across institutional boundaries by colleges 
and universities to facilitate Wi-Fi guest access was discovered in this study. Are some 
academic institutions utilizing federated authentication to facilitate guest access and, if 
so, what efficiencies and challenges can they report? Some respondents offered 
subjective comments suggesting an interest in federated authentication and active pursuit 
of such functionality but additional research is needed.  
 
Some subjects alluded to a distributed information technology organizational model in 
which departments might implement technologies over which the central IT department 
has limited influence. Such a model is probably more common in academic than in many 
other environments. In each case, subjects in this study claimed to be offering 
information regarding Wi-Fi access supported by the central information technology (IT) 
group but acknowledged that rogue access points were difficult to police and that 
departmental Wi-Fi implementations which are not a part of the central IT infrastructure 
do exist. Some respondents reporting such distributed models also reported federated 
authentication infrastructures. To what extent do rogue access points and ad hoc wireless 
offer connectivity to academic guests? Do federated authentication models implemented 
within institutions offer hope that such models can be deployed effectively between 
institutions? If so, what lessons have been learned? 
 
Although this research attempted to evaluate the impact of law and regulation on Wi-Fi 
guest access in academic settings, only general conclusions can be offered on this front.  
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Many subjects seemed reluctant to offer comments in this area or were not familiar with 
the relevant polices and practices at their institutions. 
 
Regarding HIPAA, guest Wi-Fi access is less likely to be available in environments 
subject to HIPAA regulations. When guest access is available, it is much more heavily 
secured and the networking and security staff who support Wi-Fi in institutions with 
HIPAA concerns tend to specialize in supporting the HIPAA environment. 
 
Regarding CALEA, a small percentage of respondents reported that their organizations 
are evaluating their true guest access offering in light of CALEA and may limit such 
access as a result but none had yet done so. Many subjects reported that they are hoping 
for more clarity regarding their obligations under CALEA before they take specific steps 
in response. In direct reference to CALEA concerns, one respondent indicated that their 
institution is considering contracting with an ISP to provide on-campus guest access, thus 
potentially transferring responsibilities related to CALEA as well. 
 
Although studied in this research, the type of 802.11 modulation (i.e., 802.11a, b, or g) 
was not found to be significant regarding provision of guest access. Generally speaking, 
subjects reported they provide 11b access as a lowest common denominator to allow 
older equipment to connect, provide 11g radios in WAPs for faster connections when 
upgrading equipment and provide 11a access when they encounter too much interference 
from microwave ovens or wireless landline phones or when they encounter very crowded 
locations which could benefit from 11a. Only six of nineteen respondents (32%) 
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indicated they would retire 802.11b radios if given the opportunity. Thirteen of nineteen 
(68%) indicated that they want to allow users with older cards to continue to connect. The 
802.11b network adapters in hosts are not capable of WPA2/802.11i and the oldest are 
not capable of WPA because manufactures did not make drivers available. Given that 
many 802.11b cards are and will remain in operation, requiring security based on 802.11i 
is still not feasible for most institutions. Given the above, VPN encryption options may 
gain in popularity. 
 
SSL VPN solutions were reported by several subjects to be easy to implement and 
support.  More specifically some institutions are using a captive web portal to facilitate 
making available and tunneling of Wi-Fi traffic over a virtual private network (VPN) 
created with a secure socket layer (SSL) connection. Several respondents preferred this 
method over integration of 802.1x, EAP, and 802.11 security due to the remaining 
complexities associated with implementing security using 802.x methods. Objections to 
SSL VPN solutions for securing Wi-Fi traffic included the need to reduce browser 
security to allow the creation of the encrypted tunnel, some functionality problems on 
some browser versions, and the support impact on their help desks. 
 
Most institutions offering Wi-Fi guest access employ a variety of methods to limit access 
to their sensitive information. Methods employed include designating IP address space 
based on role such that system administrators can allow or deny access by group, limiting 
or allowing access by group membership identified during authentication, and setting 
access control lists on routers, firewalls and the like. Comments from respondents 
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indicate that MAC address-based security is only utilized any longer in the provision of 
Wi-Fi guest access within academic environments by a small percentage of institutions. 
Respondents cited the ease with which MAC addresses (unique identifiers for network 
adapters) can be modified (i.e., spoofed) on modern systems as the reason. 
 
Given the lack of previous research regarding Wi-Fi guest access, it was feasible that this 
research might have revealed that a majority or even all academic institutions studied 
utilize a single or only a few vendor-provided solutions or a similar, self-designed 
approach. In fact, just the opposite appears to be true. It appears that a variety of 
composite solutions have been designed and implemented. No institution reported that a 
single commercial solution provides all the guest functionality they seek. Rather, 
combinations of commercial and custom-designed solutions are the norm. Some utilize 
complex solutions which required considerable programming and others focus on a small 
number of simple, stand alone web-based or even paper solutions with little or no central 
authentication. Some offer a very secure level of data encryption, but the majority offers 
none for Wi-Fi guest access. 
 
Private versus public status, numbers of enrolled students and numbers of WAPs 
deployed were all tracked in this study.  No notable characteristics of certain types of 
institutions which offer specific types of Wi-Fi guest access emerged from this study. 
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Appendix A:  Recruitment email 
 
 
Greetings: 
 
I am writing to you related to a posting regarding “wireless guest access” you 
contributed to a listserv recently.  I am interested in this topic and have chosen it for 
my Master's paper research.   
 
I am wondering if you might be willing to spend a few minutes on the telephone with 
me in the near future for a brief interview? I'll review some details regarding my 
research below.  If you would be so kind as to respond to this message, I would 
appreciate it. 
 
Thanks,  
--  
-- 
Kevin Lanning 
School of Information and Library Science 
UNC--Chapel Hill 
lanning at unc.edu 
 
 
1) I am Kevin Lanning, a Master’s degree candidate in Information Science at UNC-
Chapel Hill.  My contact information includes (email) lanning at unc.edu and 
(telephone) 919-445-9391.  
 
2) I have observed your responses to questions posted to a listserv regarding 
“wireless guest access” in academic environments.  I am interested in a brief 
interview with you via telephone to discuss this topic. 
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3) Participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You have no obligation to 
participate in this study and you may withdraw your participation at any time.   
 
4) Information shared by participants will be summarized in handwriting and then 
entered into a spreadsheet stored on an encrypted volume on a well-secured 
workstation on a switched, wired network.  The handwritten notes will be stored in a 
locked drawer in a locked office until entered into the spreadsheet and then will be 
shredded.  The identity of each participant will be deleted before the study is 
completed and the paper written.  No information which would allow identification 
of a participant will be included in the paper.  Approximately 20 subjects will be 
interviewed.  The original spreadsheet will be retained for 90 days after the paper is 
submitted and then will be securely deleted with no copies retained. 
 
5) A link to the final paper will be sent to the listservs from which the subject’s 
names were gathered.  If any participant objects to this, no such link will be 
provided. Rather, if any participant objects, individual participants who would like to 
see the final product will be sent a link to or the paper. 
 
6) The purpose of the study and its benefit will be to summarize and communicate 
some commonly implemented solutions to the challenges of offering guest wireless 
access which is highly available, scales to large numbers of users and which is 
secure. 
 
7) Do you have any questions I can answer for you regarding the interview I seek, 
the study and/or the paper I intend to write and publish before consenting to the 
interview?  Do you agree to me calling you via telephone? 
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Appendix B:  Interview Script 
 
1) Does your institution offer wireless guest access? If no guest access, are there any 
plans to offer this service? If no, exit interview. 
 
2) Types of guest access? Who has authority to register guests? What is the process?  
Turn around time? Max time before must apply for permanent ID? 
 
3) Total number of wireless access points? 802.11 subcommittee types?  How many 
offer guest? 
 
4) Vendor solutions to guest access or custom designed? Automated or manual? 
 
5) Concerns related to law and regulation such as HIPAA and/or CALEA?  Access 
to proprietary content concerns?   
 
6) Specific SSID for guest and is it broadcast? Diversity of SSIDs? 
 
7) Acceptable Use Policy covers wireless? Guest?  How? 
 
8) Informed consent regarding wireless risk? 
 
57 
 
9) Type of authentication in place? Future of authentication? Extensible 
authentication protocol—EAP? 
 
10) What security is in place for wireless guest access? 
a. Encryption?  
i. WEP, WPA, 802.11i. If so, key types?  
ii. VPN—ipsec, ssl? 
b. Extensible Authentication Protocol-type? Supplicants? 
c. Router or VLAN Access Control Lists? Services allowed? 
d. Logging of connections? How long logs kept? 
e. Content filtering solutions? Rate limiting? 
 
11) Future of Wi-Fi? 
12) Comments or suggestions? 
